In a recent paper, Wigglesworth claims that syntactic criteria of theoretical equivalence are not appropriate for settling questions of equivalence between logical theories, since such criteria judge classical and intuitionistic logic to be equivalent; he concludes that logicians should use semantic criteria instead. However, this is an artefact of the particular syntactic criterion chosen, which is an implausible criterion of theoretical equivalence (even in the non-logical case).
argues that the logical anti-exceptionalist-someone who "takes logical theories to be continuous with scientific theories" -must pay attention to the question of when two logical theories are equivalent, in the same way that philosophers of science have long asked the question of when two scientific theories are equivalent. To do so, he proposes taking criteria of equivalence that have been discussed in the philosophy of science, and adapting them to the context of comparing systems of logic. Whilst the overall project of comparing logical systems for equivalence or translatability is definitely an important and worthwhile project, I have some reservations about the particular conclusions Wigglesworth draws-especially, his contention that syntactic criteria for equivalence are less appropriate in the logical case than in the scientific case. This article articulates these concerns.
First, a brief summary of the syntactic criteria discussed in the philosophy of science (although these criteria originated, and are still much used, in the context of mathematics and logic). Suppose that L 1 and L 2 are two languages, but languages of the same logic; that is, that L 1 and L 2 differ only over their nonlogical vocabulary. An interpretation from L 1 to L 2 is an arity-preserving map τ from the formulae of L 1 to those of L 2 which commutes with the logical constants, so that τ (¬φ) = ¬τ (φ), τ (φ ∧ ψ) = (τ (φ) ∧ τ (ψ)), etc. Alternatively (and more relevantly to what will come later), we can consider an arity-preserving map from the nonlogical vocabulary of L 1 to formulae of L 2 , and take an interpretation to be the unique extension of such a map to a map from formulae of L 1 to formulae of L 2 , generated by requiring commutation.
Let a theory be a set of sentences, closed under the ambient logic. For any set of sentences S, let T L S denote the logical closure of S under the logic L; to reduce notational clutter when writing about logics L 1 , L 2 , etc., I'll write T i S to denote the closure of S under L i . Given two theories T 1 and T 2 , formulated in the languages L 1 and L 2 respectively, an interpretation τ : L 1 → L 2 is a translation from T 1 to T 2 if, for any L 1 -sentence φ, if φ ∈ T 1 then τ (φ) ∈ T 2 . Thus, translations are interpretations which map consequences to consequences. And we say that T 1 and T 2 are mutually interpretable if there is both a translation τ : T 1 → T 2 and a translation σ : T 2 → T 1 . Now, these ideas cannot immediately be applied to the comparison of different logical theories: since these theories (in general) use different logical constants, it is 1 (Wigglesworth, 2017, p. 1) 2 For further discussion of such criteria, see Barrett and Halvorson (2016) . 3 Here, "arity-preserving" should be taken to mean not just that it maps n-place formulae to n-place formulae, but that if exactly the variables ξ 1 , . . . , ξ n occur free in φ, then exactly those variables occur free in τ (φ); moreover, it is assumed that τ commutes with uniform substitution of variables. 4 Where the same technicalities apply as in the previous footnote. not appropriate to require that interpretations commute with all the constants. So Wigglesworth proposes a weakening, whereby one requires only that interpretations commute with negation: i.e., that τ (¬φ) = ¬τ (φ). Call this a W-interpretation; let us say that a W-interpretation between two theories is a W-translation if it maps consequences to consequences; and let us say that T 1 and T 2 are mutually W-interpretable if there are W-translations in both directions. The stated criterion of equivalence for logics is then the following: that two logics L 1 and L 2 are W-equivalent if, for any set of sentences S, T 1 S is mutually W-interpretable with T 2 S . However, this definition is problematic in a number of ways. First, the construction Wigglesworth uses to compare classical and intuitionistic logic does not suffice to show that they are W-equivalent. The problem is with the translation from classical to intuitionistic logic, which Wigglesworth claims is provided by the Gödel-Gentzen mapping γ: contra Wigglesworth, it is not the case (at least for first-order logic) that "for any S and any φ, if φ ∈ T C S , then γ(φ) ∈ T I S ." Rather, for any S and any φ,
, where γ(S) = {γ(ψ)|ψ ∈ S}. A counterexample to the original claim is provided by letting S = {¬∀xP x}: then ¬∀xP x is (trivially) a classical consequence of S, but its Gödel-Gentzen translation ¬∀x¬¬P x is not an intuitionistic consequence of S.
Second, the criterion of W-equivalence permits us to change what interpretation is being used, depending on which set of sentences we are considering the logical closure of. That is, it would fall within the definition to offer one way of translating the formulae of L 1 into those of L 2 when considering the closure of the set S, and another when considering the closure of the set S . Intuitively, this is too weak to provide a robust sense of equivalence: we would expect an interpretation between two logics to be chosen "once and for all".
Finally, the notion of a W-interpretation seems inappropriate: it is both too restrictive and too permissive. It is too restrictive, because it is unable to consider cases where we want to non-trivially interpret the negation symbol of one logic in terms of another. For example, suppose that we wish to capture the sense in which a classical logic using ¬ for negation is equivalent to one using ∼; or the sense in which a uniform replacement of ¬ by ¬¬¬ is a translation of classical logic into itself. And it is too permissive, because it puts no restrictions of uniformity on the translations of formulae featuring other connectives. For example, a W-interpretation could map
We begin with the third problem; its resolution is already to be found in the literature on translating between logics. The key idea is that whereas interpretation within a fixed background logic involved mapping formulae to one another, interpretation between logics will require us to map schemata to one another. Let us say that a schema-string is a formula featuring metalinguistic variables, such as (φ ∨ ψ) or ∀ξφ. We will take a schema to be the map from formulae (and possibly variables) to formulae that a schema-string encodes: for instance, the first schema-string encodes a map taking P, (Q → R) to (P ∨ (Q → R)), whilst the latter encodes a map taking y, F y to ∀yF y. To indicate that schemata are the maps rather than the strings, I'll use lambda notation: so the first schema-string above encodes the map λφλψ.(φ ∨ ψ), whilst the latter encodes the map λξ; λφ.∀ξφ.
Let us say that the logical vocabulary for a language consists of the logical constants for that language: we will only consider the case where the logical vocabulary consists of a set of connectives (each with a certain arity) or quantifiers (all assumed to only take a single variable and a single formula). I won't count the stock of variables as part of the logical vocabulary; I'll just assume that all the languages we consider are using the same stock of variables. Once we specify a non-logical vocabulary for the language, i.e. a stock of predicates and function-symbols, we are able to generate the set of formulae of the language in the standard recursive fashion. Since we will make use of them below, I here state the recursive clauses appropriate to any logical vocabulary:
• Given any n-place connective C in the logical vocabulary, and any formulae ψ 1 , . . . , ψ n , Cψ 1 . . . ψ n is a formula.
• Given any quantifier Q, any variable ξ, and any formula ψ, Qξψ is a formula.
I will assume that we are only considering languages with the same non-logical vocabulary. In principle, it should be reasonably straightforward to extend what I do here to languages with different non-logical vocabularies (by combining the material here with the standard work on interpretation and translation rehearsed above), but for simplicity's sake I forebear from doing so. 6 See, in particular, Pelletier and Urquhart (2003) and references therein; cf. Barrett and Halvorson (2016) and McSweeney (2016) . 7 Strictly speaking, it's somewhat ambiguous what map a schema-string encodes unless we assume some ordering on the metalinguistic variables: for instance, one could also claim that the schemastring (φ ∨ ψ) encodes a map taking P, (Q → R) to ((Q → R) ∨ P ). But this will not be an issue in practice, so I gloss over worrying about it. Now, given two languages L 1 and L 2 , a schematic interpretation T • from L 1 to L 2 consists of the following data:
• For every quantifier Q of L 1 , a one-variable and one-formula schema T Q of L 2 , with the property that for any variable ξ and any formula φ, ξ does not occur free in T Q (ξ; φ)
• If φ is atomic, then τ (φ) = T α (φ)
Call such a map an interpretation*. And given an L 1 -theory T 1 and an L 2 -theory T 2 , closed under logics L 1 and L 2 respectively, say that an interpretation* τ : L 1 → L 2 is a translation* from T 1 to T 2 if it maps consequences to consequences: that is, if φ ∈ T 1 implies τ (φ) ∈ T 2 . And, again, we can say that T 1 and T 2 are mutually interpretable* if there is a translation* from T 1 to T 2 , and from T 2 to T 1 .
In order to avoid the first and second problems discussed above, we now proceed as follows. Given two logics L 1 and L 2 , let us say that an interpretation* τ is a translation* from L 1 to L 2 if, for any set of L 1 -sentences S, τ is a translation* from T 1 S to T 1 τ (S) , where τ (S) := {τ (s)|s ∈ S}. And let us say that L 1 and L 2 are mutually interpretable* if there is a translation* from L 1 to L 2 , and a translation* from L 2 to L 1 . Mutual interpretability* does not suffer from the three problems outlined above for W-equivalence; I therefore propose to use it as a suitably debugged version of W-equivalence.
In these terms, the relevant result for Wigglesworth's argument is that classical and intuitionistic logic are mutually interpretable*. The translation* from intuitionistic to classical logic is provided by the identity mapping (since any intuitionistic consequence is always a classical consequence), and the translation* in the other direction is-as mentioned already-provided by the Gödel-Gentzen mapping γ. This mapping is generated by the following schematic interpretation, Γ • : for any formulae φ and ψ, and any variable ξ, the values of the schematic interpretation of the standard first-order logical vocabulary are
As is well-known, for any set of sentences S, γ is a translation* from T
; thus, γ is a translation* from C to I. So there are translations* in both directions, and hence C and I are mutually interpretable*, and hence equivalent according to that criterion.
Wigglesworth goes on to show that this is not the case for alternative criteria of equivalence between logics: specifically, he shows that the category of models of classical logic is not categorically equivalent to the category of models of intuitionistic logic. He claims that the difference in verdicts is due to the criterion above being a syntactic criterion (i.e. one formulated in terms of translations between sentences) whereas the category-theoretic criterion is a semantic criterion (i.e. one formulated in terms of comparisons between models). Given that classical and intuitionistic logic are not intuitively equivalent, he concludes that "though there are two general approaches-one syntactic and one semantic-to theoretical equivalence in the philosophy of science, the logical anti-exceptionalist should prefer the semantic approach."
But the syntactic criteria discussed above (i.e., W-equivalence and mutual interpretability*) are motivated by the claim that mutual interpretability is a serious contender as a criterion of equivalence in the philosophy of science. And that claim is dubious, for it is implausible to treat mutually interpretable theories as equivalent. For instance, consider the two theories T 1 and T 2 , generated by taking the (classical) 8 (Troelstra and van Dalen, 1988, p. 58 , Theorem 3.5) 9 I'm being a little loose here in talking about the category of models of classical or intuitionistic logic, since there's a bit of leeway in how exactly one characterises such a category (e.g. whether it should have homomorphisms or elementary embeddings as morphisms); but for our purposes, these details won't matter. 10 (Wigglesworth, 2017, p. 7) closure of the following sets of sentences:
Intuitively, these theories are not equivalent: T 1 is trivial, whereas T 2 is not, and it is implausible that any trivial theory should be regarded as saying the same thing as any non-trivial theory. Yet they are mutually interpretable. The only consequences of S 1 are logical validities, so (say) mapping P to F will map every consequence of S 1 to a consequence of S 2 (since logical validity is preserved by such a map). Contrariwise, mapping F to P and G to ¬P will map every consequence of S 2 to a logical validity, which is thereby a consequence of S 1 . Given Wigglesworth's discussion, this may seem somewhat surprising. For he argues that the criterion of mutual equivalence is closely related, at least in the context of classical logic, to the criterion of definitional equivalence-and, as he says, "Definitional equivalence is an interesting and powerful notion of theoretical equivalence in its own right." Certainly, definitional equivalence has received significant attention from philosophers of science. But given the example above, it seems that it could not be such an interesting or powerful notion if, as Wigglesworth claims, it is essentially equivalent to mutual interpretability: that is, if it is the case that "if [two] theories have disjoint signatures [i.e. disjoint nonlogical vocabularies], then they are definitionally equivalent iff they are mutually interpretable." However, the claim just quoted is false. Definitional equivalence entails mutual interpretability, but the converse does not hold (even when the signatures are disjoint): it is straightforward, for instance, to show that the theories T 1 and T 2 above are not definitionally equivalent. The results that Wigglesworth refers to, Theorems 1 and 2 of Barrett and Halvorson (2016) , show instead that intertranslatability is necessary and sufficient for definitional equivalence (given the disjointness of the signatures). Two theories T 1 and T 2 are intertranslatable when there exist a pair of translations τ : T 1 → T 2 and σ : T 2 → T 1 , and which are such that for any L 1 -formula φ and any 11 (Wigglesworth, 2017, p. 3) 12 See, especially, Glymour (1970) and Glymour (1977) ; for an analysis of how the (syntactic) criterion of definitional equivalence relates to semantic notions, see de Bouvère (1965). 13 (Wigglesworth, 2017, p. 3) L 2 -formula ψ,
Thus, intertranslatability is a (substantial) strengthening of mutual interpretability, requiring not only that there be translations between the two theories, but that the compositions of these translations map formulae to formulae which are equivalent modulo the ambient theory.
Introducing the notion of intertranslatability also suggests a natural strengthening of (the amended version of) the syntactic criterion discussed by Wigglesworth. Let us say that two logics L 1 and L 2 , in languages L 1 and L 2 respectively, are intertranslatable* if there are translations* τ : L 1 → L 2 and σ : L 2 → L 1 such that, for any L 1 -theory T 1 and L 1 -formula φ,
T 1 , σ(τ (φ)) 1 φ
and for any L 2 -theory T 2 and L 2 -formula ψ,
T 2 , σ(τ (ψ)) 2 ψ
where i indicates the consequence relation in L i . As one would hope, it turns out that classical and intuitionistic logic are not intertranslatable*.
Proof. Up to logical equivalence, there are only three non-trivial one-place schemata in intuitionistic logic (λφ.φ, λφ.¬φ and λφ.¬¬φ). Thus, there are only three possible interpretations of each of the classical atomic and negation schemata in intuitionistic logic. This means nine interpretation-schemata from (the pure negation fragment of) classical logic to intuitionistic logic; however, it is easy to show that six of these do not generate translations*, even over this fragment. This leaves the interpretationschemata
